I. INTRODUCTION
Subnational implementation of human rights law has been the subject of increasing interest among scholars and litigators in recent years, building on the call for independent state constitutionalism 1 and the rise of New Federalism.
2 For state constitutionalists, international human rights law provides a legitimating source for articulating state constitutional principles not captured in federal constitutional law. For human rights advocates, state courts provide an alternative and possibly friendlier forum for some of these kinds of claims. With the prominent success of some of these international and comparative arguments, 3 state court decisions applying international human rights law have become the subject of systematic study and coordinated advocacy efforts. 4 The space for independent state action to implement international human rights law may have been limited somewhat by the Supreme Court's 2008 decision in Medellín v. Texas.
5
That opinion contains language suggesting that non-self-executing treaties, including ratified human rights treaties, do not even have the status of domestic law absent implementing legislation. 6 Under this view of the non-self-execution doctrine, states are under no obligation to respect or enforce even ratified treaty law until it is implemented through federal legislation. Despite the outpouring of scholarship suggesting that the Court's language should not be interpreted this broadly, 7 this view of the non-self-execution doctrine is becoming the law on the ground, at least in state courts. 6. The Court stated, "What we mean by 'self-executing' is that the treaty has automatic domestic effect . . . upon ratification. Conversely, a 'non-self-executing' treaty does not by itself give rise to domestically enforceable federal law." Medellín, 552 U.S. at 505 n. 2. See also id. at 504 ("This Court has long recognized the distinction between treaties that automatically have effect as domestic law, and those that-while they constitute international law commitments-do not by themselves function as binding federal law").
7. Curtis Bradley, for example, acknowledges that the Court's statements could be viewed as stating that treaties "have no domestic law status at all," but contends that the decision should be interpreted to mean only that non-self-executing treaties are not judicially-enforceable. Curtis Bradley, Intent, Presumptions, and Non-Self-Executing Treaties, 102 The ICCPR was ratified subject to a declaration of non-execution. As such, appellant has no judicially enforceable right directly arising out of a challenge to the ICCPR as it would be interpreted by its signatory nations; his argument can attack only the breadth of United States law implementing the treaty. This case does not involve such an attack. Until the treaty is implemented through congressional action, it cannot act as a limitation on the power of the Florida Legislature to determine the appropriate penalties for violations of the law. My purpose here is to determine what effect this reading of Medellín would have on the future of international state constitutionalism. To do so, I study the conditions under which state jurists have engaged with the international human rights treaties the United States has signed or ratified, in order to consider whether and how these interactions will be affected by this new understanding of the status of treaty law. I begin in Part II by briefly reviewing the different paths through which human rights treaty law could be raised in state court cases. I then turn in Part III to surveying the activity on the ground. I examine the state cases that cite these treaties in order to identify when and how state courts engage substantively with these instruments. This in turn provides insight into possible advocacy strategies for increasing state court consideration of treaty norms. Finally, in Part IV, I consider these findings to assess how the Medellín decision will impact the international prospects of state constitutionalism. I conclude that because state courts have been more receptive to arguments based on treaty instruments as non-binding, persuasive authority, even the broadest reading of Medellín will not end this type of human rights advocacy.
II. PATHS TO STATE COURT CONSIDERATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES
Even prior to Medellín, state participation in treaty implementation was complicated by the doctrinal uncertainty surrounding the status of these treaties in domestic law, as well as the mixed messages that the federal government had sent to the states as to their role in implementing these instruments. As a formal matter, not all human rights treaties have equal status in United States law. There are some treaties that the United States has signed, but that have not been adopted by the Senate.
9 Then there are instruments that the United States has signed and ratified, but that have not been implemented through federal legislation. 10 Finally, or carried out by way of legislation. The International Covenant is neither self-executing nor has it been implemented by way of domestic legislation.") (citations omitted there are treaties that have been signed, ratified, and implemented through federal legislation.
11
As the "supreme Law of the Land," 12 ratified international human rights treaties would seem to have a stronger case for domestic enforceability in state courts than the instruments that have not yet been approved by the Senate. Nonetheless, a variety of procedural barriers make this story far more complicated. The international human rights treaties that have been ratified were adopted with provisions rendering them non-self-executing, which has been interpreted to mean that they cannot supply the cause of action in federal court. 13 Scholars have argued, however, that even if these treaties do not supply the cause of action, they must be considered and enforced once a cause of action is established through another channel. ("Even if a treaty is deemed non-self-executing, the United States and its constituent states are still bound by it. As such, a court considering the legality of government action must take such treaty obligations into account. Even on the federal level, the non-selfexecuting nature of a treaty simply precludes private enforcement action and use of the treaty to secure jurisdiction. It does not bar judicial consideration and enforcement of the treaty's terms once a cause of action and jurisdiction is secured on some other basis." (citations omitted)).
15 22. Coverage in the ALLSTATES database begins in 1658. It includes the decisions of the highest courts of all the states that were part of the union prior to 1948, the year in which the UDHR-the oldest instrument studied here-was adopted. It also includes decisions from at least some of the lower courts of all the states and the District of Columbia, but the times at which coverage of these courts begins varies greatly.
23. The citations break down is as follows: the ICCPR was cited 118 times; the CAT was cited 24 times; the CRC was cited sixteen times; the Genocide Convention was cited four times; CEDAW was cited four times; the ICESCR was cited three times; the CERD was cited sixteen times; and the CRPD was cited once.
24. This snapshot may not represent a complete picture of state court citation of these treaties because some of the decisions may not be published or available on Westlaw. See supra note 23. This search also fails to catch instances in which courts referred to the treaties differently, like, for example, referencing the International Finally, these are not all discrete cases. In some instances, the treaty was referred to in the opinions of multiple courts addressing the same case and some cases reference more than one treaty. Nonetheless, even without a precise count, it is clear that the pool is extremely small. law. 25 Others simply reject entirely the notion that treaty-based claims can be raised by private parties. 26 The complexities go beyond the selfexecution debate, however, as state courts attempt to understand their own particular relationship with these treaties. Justice Houston drew attention to this problem in a concurring opinion in Ex parte Pressley, 27 a case in which the court was asked to invalidate the death sentence of a juvenile offender based on the ICCPR. 28 The majority relied upon a ratification reservation which reserved for " [t] he United States" the ability to impose capital punishment on any person other than a pregnant woman "subject to its constitutional constraints."
29 Justice Houston, in concurrence, noted that "the United States" was referred to as single entity and he thus expressed his concern that the reservation was applicable only to the federal government. 30 Nonetheless, he reluctantly joined the majority's conclusion, noting that the U.S. Supreme Court had denied a petition for certiorari in a similar case from the Nevada Supreme Court, which split 3-2 in rejecting the juvenile defendant's claim that his execution violated the ICCPR.
31
Uncertainty with how international human rights law claims should be treated in state courts may partially explain the somewhat odd pattern in which they appear. Although one might expect citations to ratified treaties (as the law of the land) to be far more frequent than the unratified treaties, the pattern is actually more complex. The ratified treaties are cited more often than the unratified treaties; however, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, which is a non-binding aspirational statement of shared principles, is cited both more frequently than any of 25 the ratified treaties with the exception of the ICCPR and more often than any of the signed but as yet unratified treaties. 32 Moreover, as discussed below, 33 persuasive citations to the UDHR have arguably had more direct impact on the outcomes of the cases in which they were raised than references to the ratified treaties.
Some of the cases suggest actual confusion among jurists (or perhaps among the parties appearing before them) about the status of these instruments in domestic law. In In re Julie Anne, 34 an Ohio court held that parents were restrained from smoking in front of minor child. 35 The court noted that under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), courts of law, state legislatures, and administrative agencies have a duty as a matter of human rights law to reduce children's compelled exposure to tobacco smoke. 36 But the court mistakenly suggested that the CRC had been ratified by the U.S.
37
In other instances, state courts' ambiguity about the treaty's status may be purposeful. In a 2007 case by the Supreme Court of Hawai'i, the court relied on the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) to reach its holding that the state constitutional right to privacy does not prevent the criminalization of prostitution. 38 The court noted that the consensus in the international community is that prostitution has negative consequences, and that the U.S. has agreed to "take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to suppress all forms of traffic in women and exploitation of prostitution of women." 39 The court did not explain, however, that the U.S. has failed to ratify CEDAW, despite noting that several other countries have ratified it and referencing a link to the UN Division on the Advancement of Women that explains the status of the treaty in each state. 40 Thus, it seems plausible that the court wished to downplay the treaty's formal status.
To the extent that the human rights treaties do appear in state court jurisprudence, they are only rarely used as scholars have suggested as a source for non-binding but persuasive authority in state constitutional or statutory interpretation. The frequency with which these treaties are 32 cited appears to have increased over the years, 41 but the change has predominately resulted from an increase in the parties' reliance on these instruments as binding authority that prohibits the imposition of a particular type of criminal sanction. 42 Although the parties have often been quite creative in their framing of these arguments, courts around the country have generally been dismissive of the claim that they are bound by even the ratified instruments, although the reasons for their rejection of these sources have varied.
Viewed with a wide lens, therefore, the practice of international state constitutionalism still appears to be limited. Nonetheless, a more detailed examination of the cases suggests they have had an impact that is significant and disproportionate to their numbers. Whether accepted or rejected by the courts, treaty-based arguments offer openings for embedding these instruments into the domestic rights discourse in ways that appear to have tangible results. Despite their relative infrequency, these cases both individually and collectively appear to have been quite meaningful. Therefore, it is worth continuing to develop a more nuanced understanding of the practice. 
A. International Treaty Law as Persuasive
There is a small but significant group of opinions in which state courts have used international human rights treaties in the informative but non-binding way that most scholars have envisioned. The most prominent are those decided by state appellate and high courts on controversial or challenging issues of state constitutional interpretation. These include the previously-referenced California Supreme Court's decision on same-sex marriage which cited to the ICCPR, 44 the Missouri Supreme Court's reliance on the CRC to strike down the juvenile death penalty, 45 and the Oregon Supreme Court's references to the UDHR, the ICCPR, and the European Convention to interpret a state constitutional provision governing the treatment of the incarcerated. 46 However, it is not just the most high-profile and politically charged cases where international human rights law has been valuable. In a custody hearing 41 . Of the 187 citations, all but 25 have occurred since January 1, 2000. This trend may also be attributable to the increasing electronic accessibility of state court opinions.
42. Usually, these challenges occur in the criminal context and most are to the imposition of the death penalty or the sentencing of a juvenile to life without the possibility of parole. Citations to the ICCPR make up over half of the pool and the vast majority of these occur in criminal cases.
43 in a New York family court in 2008, the court referenced the principles of the CRC in interpreting the Family Court Act to require age appropriate consultation with the child at a permanency hearing. 47 The court relied on the CRC provision as evidence of a widespread norm toward permitting the participation of a child in proceedings that affect him and thus interpreted the statute consistently with the treaty. 48 In another New York case, the court engaged in a lengthy discussion of the United States' obligations under both the ICCPR and the CRPD 49 in reading a New York guardianship statute to require "periodic review to prevent the abuses which may otherwise flow from the state's grant of power over a person with disabilities." 50 Thus, international human rights law may prove a useful tool in rights advocacy at all levels.
Although tracking the treaty's path into the court's analysis is difficult, two identifiable sources are apparent from the study. First, these "soft law" uses of treaty law seem to occur most frequently when the writing judge or justice is one who adopts a strong vision of independent state constitutionalism.
Second, and perhaps quite obviously, this methodology succeeds when it has previously been successful in other state or federal courts.
Receptive Judges
Identifying the role that a judge or justice plays in the case analysis is challenging, especially given that for many state court decisions, the parties' briefings are not electronically available. Nonetheless, there are some correlations that can be drawn based on an external understanding of the jurist's philosophy or judging. There are a handful of state judges who have written about the use of international and comparative sources and, not coincidentally, some of them have authored opinions that employ these strategies. 51 For example, retired Chief Justice Margaret H. prisoners' sexually intimate bodily areas, except in cases where a patdown was necessitated by the immediate circumstances. 57 In reaching this holding, Linde noted that the Oregon Constitution has five provisions regarding the treatment of prisoners that have no federal counterpart, 58 including a provision "confin[ing] 'rigorous' treatment of prisoners within constitutional bounds of necessity." 59 In determining that unnecessary cross-gender patdown searches violated this guarantee, Justice Linde drew on a variety of sources including the standards adopted by the Federal Bureau of Prisons, the American Bar Association, and the American Correctional Association. Linde also noted that "the same principles [that animate these standards] have been a worldwide concern recognized by the United Nations and other multinational bodies," and then cited the relevant provisions of the UDHR and the ICCPR. 60 The international human rights instruments function in this decision not as binding authority, 61 but as persuasive evidence of a shared concept of dignity.
Similarly in Moore v. Ganim, 62 a case challenging the constitutionality of a Connecticut statute that limited the general assistance benefits that employable persons could receive to no more than nine months in a year, 63 Justice Ellen Ash Peters, writing in concurrence, relied on the UDHR to argue for finding a governmental obligation under the Connecticut Constitution to provide for minimal subsistence.
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She tied the provision of welfare to "contemporary notions about democracy and universal suffrage," 65 as articulated in UDHR article 25(1), which declares that:[E]veryone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control. Although Justice Peters recognized that the UDHR does not bind the United States, she nonetheless asserted that "the wide international agreement on at least the hortatory goals identified in the human rights documents strongly supports the plaintiff's claim." 67 Thus, individual judges may play a significant role in incorporating international and comparative sources into state jurisprudence. Those who are more likely to do so appear to also favor robust state constitutionalism and therefore are looking for supporting sources to help articulate the state's constitutional vision.
Modeling the Behavior of Other Courts
A second way that the soft law approach appears in state court cases is when the court is modeling the practice adopted by other courts in a particular type of case. controversially considered international treaty law and comparative law sources in reaching its conclusion that the Eighth Amendment bars the imposition of the death penalty on juveniles. 69 In so doing, the Supreme Court was actually following the lead of the Missouri courts, which had relied on these same sources in making their original determination.
70
Since that decision, litigants have raised treaty law norms in other Eighth Amendment claims and, following the Supreme Court's lead, some state courts have been willing to consider these sources. For example, in People v. Pratcher, 71 a California appellate court considered a challenge by a juvenile defendant to the constitutionality of a 50-year sentence. 72 Citing Roper, Pratcher argued that there is an international consensus against sentencing minors to life imprisonment. 73 The court considered the international sources, with particular emphasis on the Convention on the Rights of the Child, but determined that the lack of legislative or judicial consensus in the United States against lengthy sentences for juveniles was dispositive.
74
Although the defendant's claim was ultimately rejected, the court did adopt the Supreme Court's method of considering the treaty's guarantees and its level of acceptance in the international community as a potentially persuasive argument. These two types of opinions represent a small subset of the already small pool of state court decisions referencing international human rights treaties. Despite their rarity, these decisions are powerful because of the norms they establish and the way in which these norms are then transmitted vertically and horizontally among state and federal courts. The conditions under which these decisions have occurred suggest a strategy for maximizing the occurrence of this phenomenon. Given that individual jurists appear to play a key role in incorporating these instruments into state court decisions, more attention should perhaps be paid to identifying them. The judicial philosophies of the U.S. Supreme Court are well-known-and the particular leanings of the federal circuits are certainly considered by advocates seeking a friendly forum for particular rights-related claims. These cases suggest that similar attention should be paid to understanding state courts, despite the additional complexity of doing so. Given that the jurists who have used international or comparative human rights law tend to also seem (at least in some cases) to be advocates of independent state constitutionalism, states with established primacy or interstitial methods of state constitutional interpretation 80 will likely include some judges or justices who are receptive to these types of claims. Additionally, there may be personal or professional characteristics shared by those judges and justices that predict a greater openness or comfort with these types of claims.
81 Even a single jurist, such as Justice Peters in Moore, may be responsive to treaty-based arguments and find ways to incorporate these norms into the conversation. And once the arguments are present in one state's jurisprudence, they may then become more persuasive to other courts at the state and federal level. 
B. International Human Rights Treaty Law as Binding
In the remaining opinions, which constitute the large majority of the sample, the treaties appear in the decisions because they have been raised by the parties as binding law to be applied in the court, generally in the context of the death penalty. Although most of these challenges have failed, at least to the extent that the courts have consistently rejected arguments that capital punishment is prohibited by these treaties, they have contributed to a deeper and more localized dialogue about these rights and their meaning, which in some instances has changed the operative norms.
Coordinated Litigation Strategies
By far the most common scenario in which binding claims based on the ratified international human treaties are introduced in state courts is in challenges to the practice of capital punishment and life without parole. Again, any relationship between the individual cases is difficult to identify from the opinions themselves, but an external view suggests that they are part of a coordinated litigation strategy.
Around the mid-1990s . . . a transnational network of human rights activists, NGOs, and defense lawyers began a campaign to bring national criminal justice systems into conformity with the abolition of the death penalty in the ICCPR. In countries where capital punishment persisted-most notably the United States-the network of these "norm entrepreneurs" worked to limit the application of the death penalty through novel arguments rooted in emerging international and foreign practices. 82 In this context, it seems plausible to characterize the increase in frequency of these claims in state court opinions as resulting in part from coordinated and concerted effort. The notable appearance of human rights law in Supreme Court opinions striking down some applications of the death penalty has likely led advocates to raise treaty-based claims in more cases, if only for preservation in the event of future changes in the law. 83 Significantly, however, the successful treaty-based arguments were not based on their use as binding authority.
Despite the failure of these arguments to effect direct change in particular cases, coordinated campaigns raising claims based on international treaty law may help to build awareness of and engagement with these instruments among both jurists and litigants, even if the claims are unsuccessful. Moreover, the awareness they create may result in adoption of the right or the norm outside of the courts. This has happened in the death penalty context. Despite formal rejection of the argument that international treaty law requires the abolition of the death penalty, reliance on capital punishment has decreased in the United States, assisted in some instances by decisions of the United States Supreme Court limiting the contexts in which it is permissible.
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A similar phenomenon occurred in litigation surrounding U.S. compliance with the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Professor Janet Koven Levit explains that by the time the United States Supreme Court rejected the possibility of a judicial remedy for violations of the right to consular notification, the "core goal of Vienna Convention litigation, compliance, had been met." 85 In other words, despite the fact that courts have generally rejected the possibility of mandating a remedy for VCCR violations, the ongoing vertical and horizontal dialogue on these instruments has resulted in an increase in state and local compliance with the treaty's notification requirement. Therefore, even rejected treaty claims may, in certain circumstances, ultimately have rights-enhancing effects.
Interbranch Debates
A second way that binding claims have been raised is through interbranch dialogue at the state level. In other words, the court is asked to consider the legality of another branch's interaction with the treaty. In California, the legislature passed legislation defining a term in the state constitution in accordance with CERD in order to permit some forms of preferential treatment based on race. 86. CERD specifically permits the use of "special measures securing adequate advancement of certain racial or ethnic groups or individuals requiring such protection," which may conflict with the limitations the Supreme Court has placed on the use of affirmative action programs. numerous legal challenges, and in C & C Construction v. Sacramento Municipal Utility District, 87 a California appeals court determined that the legislature had unconstitutionally infringed on the power of the courts to interpret the constitution. 88 Professor J. Owens Smith, who was responsible for the research and drafting of the legislation, said in the aftermath of the decision that the state court erred in failing to accord the appropriate weight to the ratified treaty.
89 "The state constitution should be subordinate to the human rights treaty," he said. 92 the appellate court was asked to strike down a San Francisco business ordinance that required race-and gender-conscious remedies in the awarding of city contracts as a means of ameliorating the effects of past discrimination. 93 The court again concluded that the California legislature's enactment of Section 8315 amounted to a legislative attempt to amend the state constitution without following the proper procedures for amendment. 94 The City contended that C&C was wrongly decided because: 88. The Court explained that "Assembly Bill No. 703 amounted to an attempt by the Legislature and the Governor to amend the California Constitution without complying with the procedures for amendment. This attempt was manifestly beyond their constitutional authority." Id. at 726. The California Supreme Court declined to review the case. The relationship between CERD and the provision in question, and the state's obligations with respect to CERD, were raised for the first time on appeal and thus summarily dismissed. Id. at 726-27. The court did note, however, that CERD permits "special measures" only to ensure certain racial or ethnic groups or individuals "equal enjoyment or exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms. . . ." Id. (citing CERD art. 1 § 4). The court determined that the decision to ban affirmative action programs by referendum meant that the California citizenry had determined that "special measures are not only unnecessary to ensure human rights and fundamental freedoms in California, but inimical to those principles." Id. at 727. Therefore, the court concluded that the special measures authorized by CERD "are not permitted in California, even under the Convention." Id.
89 The court rejected this argument as violative of separation of powers and federalism, reasoning that the "Legislature's duty to respond to a federal treaty does not come fortified with federal superpowers enabling it to bypass the judicial and amendatory processes." 96 The court then considered the city's alternative argument, that Section 8315 was preempted by the Race Convention's definition of discrimination. 97 The court agreed that that this would be true if the laws conflicted, but the court concluded that the CERD does not require the use of race-based affirmative action programs.
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Although the outcome in this case was ultimately disappointing for affirmative action proponents, this case is arguably still a success for domestic enforcement of international human rights. State level incorporation of the treaty's norm occurred legislatively and was then challenged in the courts. The court accepted the binding authority of the treaty, but rejected the proponents' interpretation of what the instrument required.
These two categories of cases may be lost post-Medellín, although these claims should continue to be raised at least until the Court weighs in again on the problem of non-self-execution. This course of action may have little immediate impact on the outcome of cases in which treaty law is raised as binding authority. This study suggests that courts have not generally been receptive to these claims. Nonetheless, the loss of even the minimal attention that is currently given to these claims as they are raised repeatedly in different courts impoverishes the conversation about these rights and may slow the progress toward their acceptance through other channels. under an earlier understanding of the doctrine, states and localities had the (unenforceable) obligation and mandate to implement ratified treaties, this space for sub-national innovation disappears if these instruments have no meaning in domestic law absent federal legislation. 99 
IV. HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES AND STATE CONSTITUTIONALISM
From this study it appears that state courts, with notable exceptions, have been somewhat slow to answer the call to engage with international human rights treaty law. In some ways, the absence here parallels the failure of independent state constitutionalism more generally. 100 Indeed, some of the barriers are likely similar. At the technical level, state courts face considerably larger case loads and may be more vulnerable to the political consequences of accepting treaty-based claims. 101 Their ability to consider these claims may also be limited by their own lack of expertise with these materials, and by the failure of the parties to make arguments based on international or comparative sources.
To the extent that these explanations are valid, 102 many of these barriers are already in the process of being overcome. 103 Increasingly, there are educational opportunities for state court judges to learn to handle international claims. For example, international materials are becoming more accessible in legal education. More law clerks (and future judges) will be exposed in law school to basic international law principles and will have the opportunity to apply these principles in a human rights clinic. Additionally, interest has grown among American lawyers in the area of international human rights law. "Like judges, they are meeting with their global counterparts and being exposed to new ideas. . . . Legal organizations like the ACLU and the ABA now have conferences on international law and international human rights, such as the ACLU Human Rights at Home: International Law in U.S. Courts
Conference." 104 Thus, to the extent that the explanation is logistical, it is likely that we will see an increase in the use of these sources as the consideration of these instruments becomes easier. 105 Alternatively, it is possible that there is a more fundamental tension between the project of state constitutionalism and that of international human rights law that is blocking broader engagement with these instruments at the state level.
The normative justification for independent state constitutionalism-that is, one that goes beyond the instrumental value of incorporating at the state level policies that cannot be implemented nationally-is that state constitutions do and should reflect the variations in the polity. In this view, a "state constitution is a fit place for the people of a state to record their moral values, their definition of justice, their hopes for a common good. A state constitution defines a way of life." 106 James Gardner has argued that this model does not reflect the reality of the United States' modern political community and that this "type of robust state constitutionalism . . . could pose a serious threat to the nationwide stability and sense of community that nationalism constitutionalism provides." 107 These critiques are equally applicable to the use of international human rights law in the project of state constitutionalism in that they undermine the legitimacy of statelevel innovation. Moreover, the use of international human rights law to advance this project presents an additional challenge given the tension between the universal principles these instruments embody and the promotion of distinct and distinctive state constitutions.
My purpose here is not to resolve either the pragmatic or normative challenges to international state constitutionalism. Rather, my focus has been on what the limited existing state court jurisprudence reveals about the instrumental possibilities of international state constitutionalism as an advocacy strategy. In that vein, this study suggests that even if these structural barriers are not resolved, advocates may beneficially engage state courts with these issues with meaningful results and offers some strategic guidance as to where these efforts are most likely to be successful. Somewhat counter-intuitively, it appears that most direct impact of this kind of treaty law is likely to come from its least direct applications. As an authoritative (but not binding) source of widely shared norms, these instruments are persuasive to judges developing new understandings of state constitutional law. Conversely, the arguments based on these treaties as a binding source of law have been less successful in the courts, but have contributed to the adoption of the norms via other channels.
Given these findings, the Medellín decision need not be fatal to the prospects of international constitutionalism. The experience reflected in this study suggests that advocates should continue to raise alternative soft law uses for international human rights treaties in state courts. 108 Despite the fact that many of the norms embodied in the UDHR are found in the ICCPR and in CERD, two treaties that the United States has ratified, 109 arguments based on their persuasive value (as well as the persuasive value of the UDHR) seem to have gained more traction with state courts. 110 It is possible that the ambiguity surrounding the domestic enforceability of these treaties, which will only be enhanced by Medellín, causes hesitance among state court judges to wade into a complex and confusing debate. And given that ratified treaties at least arguably have the status of federal law and must be applied consistently, state courts may be reluctant to move forward on binding treaty-based claims absent federal leadership. Thus, somewhat counterintuitively, this study suggests that state courts may be more receptive to soft law claims based on treaty law, whether ratified or unratified. This is certainly not to say that nothing is lost if the facial reading of Medellín is ultimately upheld, but it may mean that at least this valuable type of human rights advocacy can proceed relatively unhindered. 108 . This generally appears to be happening, except in some parts of the death penalty practice. Increasingly, however, my review of the cases suggests that advocates seem to be making alternative arguments-that the human rights instruments are both binding and persuasive authority.
109. As Professor Tara Melish notes, there is "wide overlap in the rights protected in distinct human rights treaties. CEDAW, CRC, and ICESCR subject matters are thus regularly taken up through ICCPR, CERD, CAT, and [International Labor Organization] convention supervisory procedures." Tara Melish, From Paradox to Subsidiarity: The United States and Human Rights, 34 YALE J. INT'L L. 389, 397 n. 34 (2009). Thus, were advocates looking to make binding arguments based on ratified treaties, they could arguably do so under the existing legal regime. The fact that they in many cases do not suggests an understanding of the nuances I have identified here.
110. The clearest example of this is in the death penalty context with the Supreme Court's acceptance of the persuasive authority of these treaties in Roper and Atkins. Nonetheless, this phenomenon is pervasive. In the Opportunity Agenda's 2008 report on international law in state courts, all but one of the fourteen state court decisions that they consider to be "highlights" of the practice involve the persuasive, non-binding citation of authority. See OPPORTUNITY AGENDA, supra note 4, at 6-7 (listing cases).
